Since conservative Yoon Suk Yeol became president of South Korea eight months ago, North Korea has drastically increased military provocations. In an incident last month, at least five North Korean drones freely crossed into South Korea’s airspace. One drone infiltrated the northern end of a no-fly zone surrounding the president’s office. Many South Koreans fear that the North’s heightened aggression is a precursor to a second Korean War.
Putting the Korean fear into perspective leads me to think of what factors may incentivize the North to have a direct military confrontation with the South. There are three factors that could lead to a heightened conflict.
The first is Russia’s military success in Ukraine. At the moment, Vladimir Putin appears to be not very successful in the Russia-Ukraine war. However, if Putin can control four regions of Ukraine — Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia — that were annexed by Russia last September, he may claim victory and likely gain popular approval for his mission to rectify perceived injustices and regain lost Russian lands and Russian communities.
Putin’s military adventures are, if successful, likely to encourage Kim Jong Un of the North to undertake a military assault against Yoon who has tried to back Kim into a corner since May. Yoon’s full-court press is odd given that he has no authority to maneuver his soldiers in case of war. The four-star U.S. general of ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command will maintain wartime operational control. Nevertheless, Yoon has been pursuing the strategy of an eye for an eye by insisting on preemptive strikes on the North. Kim seems convinced that Yoon is bluffing, so he is willing to raise the bet with more actions including nuclear weapon tests and direct military clashes.
There is a historical precedent of a relationship between the North’s military aggression and the South’s bluffing. Then-President Kim Il Sung of the North invaded the South after learning that Syngman Rhee, South Korea’s founding president, was advocating marching north and capturing Pyongyang for the unification of the Korean peninsula when he had little military capabilities.
That bluffing — and, of course, Kim’s political ambitions — cost the lives of nearly 5 million people during the Korean War.
The second factor is China’s economic frustration. Since its economic opening in 1978, China has enjoyed a high rate of gross domestic product growth. However, President Xi Jinping faces an economic slowdown due to tepid productivity growth and stiff international competition. Xi is particularly displeased with President Joe Biden, who wants to hobble China’s progress in the semiconductor industry. If Xi continues to feel hopeless about getting out of economic trouble and trapped by the Biden initiative to isolate China’s chip industry, the chances are that he will search for aggressive ways to open foreign markets.
Nineteenth-century French economist, Frederic Bastiat once prophesied: “When goods do not cross frontiers, armies will.” Japan’s 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor is consistent with the Bastiat prediction. The U.S. exported most of its gasoline and machine tools before it imposed a series of stringent economic sanctions on imperial Japan. Then-Prime Minister Hideki Tojo decided to confront the U.S. challenges by attacking and occupying U.S. territories.
No one can guarantee that Xi will shy away from taking a militaristic approach when China loses its competitive edge in the global market from rising economic nationalism among major trading partners. Xi may be willing to use force to secure markets for Chinese products. If he initiates war in the Pacific, he is likely to prod his key ally, Kim, to attack South Korea to create a multitheater war.
The U.S. is prepared to simultaneously fight two major conflicts in different parts of the world, but it is likely to run into trouble if it has to deal with the Russia-Ukraine war in Europe and potentially ominous conflicts in Asia. Kim is unlikely to miss the opportunity to advance his security interests in the Korean Peninsula.
The third factor is South Korea’s security vulnerability. Although the South’s military power is superior to the North’s, excluding nuclear weapons, its civilian leadership is not yet up to standard. It may be a moot point to debate whether Yoon is a draft dodger or lacks military expertise since he was elected by popular vote. However, it remains questionable whether Yoon makes his security decisions with the aid of experts with a proven record.
In their 20s, Yoon’s national security advisers refused to fulfill military duty. . They betrayed the public trust by letting North Korean drones spy over Seoul. Amid public uproar, Yoon and his advisers blamed the former president by asserting that Moon Jae-in’s inadequate military drills brought about the crisis. Yoon then vowed to install a defense system for capturing North Korean drones. But Yoon did not know that such a system was already created and run by the Moon government up until he became president eight months ago.
It does not matter how advanced the South’s military technology is when the civilian leadership appears to neglect to do its homework — such as learning what military technology is available and how South Korea can use it against the enemy. Why are eight months not long enough for Yoon and his advisers to finish their job training on security and defense? How soon can those rookies get their act together?
In the meantime, the South’s inept leadership is likely to embolden Kim to escalate South-North conflicts to the highest level.
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ABOUT THE WRITER
Seung-Whan Choi teaches Korean politics and international relations at the University of Illinois at Chicago. A retired Army officer, he is also the author of four books.
