When NATO leaders met this week in the capital of Lithuania, Russia’s war in Ukraine loomed large. With Sweden’s membership all but settled, Ukraine’s future with the alliance was the biggest question on everyone’s mind.
Ukraine wants an invitation to join. NATO leaders had been split on whether to offer one. They ultimately agreed that they would “extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the alliance” but without specifying when or how, per a summit communiqué.
The debate over Ukraine’s potential NATO membership centers on whether it would deter Russia from invading Ukraine again or would instead provoke Russia and drag the entire alliance into war. The bigger question for NATO members should be whether the risk of the latter is worth the benefit to NATO.
I believe that question can only be answered with any certainty once the war is done. An offer of membership won’t hasten that conclusion, so the question of Ukraine’s membership is premature, serving neither the interests of NATO nor peace.
Even Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy understands that NATO cannot admit Ukraine while the war is raging. That would automatically put NATO in direct conflict with Russia. Despite a strong commitment to Ukraine’s security, backed by billions of dollars in military assistance, the United States and other allies have made clear they have no interest in starting World War III by taking the fight directly to a nuclear-armed Russia.
NATO allies who strongly favor Ukraine’s ultimate accession, particularly those that border Russia, such as Poland, want NATO to provide a specific and accelerated timetable for Ukraine to join once the war is concluded. They believe that a clear path for bringing Ukraine into the alliance is the best way to prevent future Russian aggression, against Ukraine or NATO countries directly.
Others disagree. The U.S. is the most vocal but not the only NATO country that views such assurances as unnecessary provocations to Russia. Germany has also been reluctant to make that commitment. These allies advocate a strong show of support to Ukraine, including more material commitments, but ensuring that NATO is not dragged into the war remains the top priority. For them, committing to a specific timeline for Ukraine’s future membership would provide little real benefit to outweigh the risk of further goading Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Such a commitment would be largely symbolic. It would not change Ukraine’s status today, nor would it change NATO’s already robust provision of assistance.
The biggest benefit to Ukraine’s cause, and NATO’s corresponding interest, would be a boost of confidence to the Ukrainian government, military and people, who could likely use some good news as the long-awaited counteroffensive grinds on in fits and starts.
This is not an inconsequential factor. Morale has played a strong role in helping Ukraine’s far smaller military outplay the Kremlin’s at various points in this war. War fatigue could multiply Kyiv’s challenges. The cost of that morale boost, though, would be a strong disincentive for Putin to accept an end to the war. The failed mutiny in June revealed that Putin’s grip on Russia, which once looked firm, could be slipping. But the impending threat of Ukraine joining NATO could be the rallying cry Putin needs to solidify support for this war in the Russian public and political class.
Seven in 10 Russians said that NATO membership for Ukraine would threaten Russia, and preventing it is a top benefit of Russia’s military action in Ukraine, according to a new survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Levada Center in Moscow, one of Russia’s last remaining independent polling firms. If ending the war means Ukraine joins NATO, a lot of Russians might feel differently about their commitment to the fight.
The debate within NATO is reminiscent of a similar one at NATO’s summit 15 years ago, when the United States wanted to offer both Ukraine and Georgia action plans for membership, while Germany thought it would be unnecessarily confrontational. With no uniform position, Ukraine and Georgia got the worst of both worlds: enough to provoke Russia but no added protection. Russia invaded Georgia within months and Ukraine a few years later.
Reasonable people can draw opposite conclusions from this outcome. Proponents of Ukraine’s membership say that a path to NATO membership then would have prevented any Russian aggression. Opponents argue that it was the promise of future membership that pushed Russia over the edge.
Unlike in 2008, however, Russia is already at war with Ukraine today, dug in across significant portions of Ukrainian territory. Ending war, not preventing it, is the immediate focus.
While I do not buy the “NATO made Putin do it” argument, I do believe a promise to admit Ukraine after the war ends would be an obstacle to Russia accepting peace and that NATO allies today can’t know if Ukraine’s membership will be a benefit or burden when that peace finally comes.
It might be unsatisfying to Ukraine today to leave Vilnius with no clear path, but it’s the best decision for the possibility of peace and the interests of NATO’s existing members in the future.
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ABOUT THE WRITER
Elizabeth Shackelford is a senior fellow on U.S. foreign policy with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. She was previously a U.S. diplomat and is the author of “The Dissent Channel: American Diplomacy in a Dishonest Age.”
