PM Chris Hipkins brushes the Aukus security pact away as not relevant to us because of its nuclear component, but our likely Aukus involvement relating to technology will have far-reaching consequences
Opinion: While Stuart Nash's boastful ego was putting the skids under his ministerial career last week, an issue of far more potential long-term importance to New Zealand was unfolding in San Diego. It received only passing media coverage here, although it did attract some critical academic analysis. Yet its consequences are likely to affect New Zealand’s future long after Nash’s plummeting career is over and forgotten.
The meeting between the United States President and the British and Australian prime ministers formalised the long-heralded Aukus nuclear submarine defence pact between the three countries. Ostensibly, it's a security agreement for what the US now calls the Indo-Pacific region. But really, it is a pact to counter China’s growing regional influence, in much the same way as the now-defunct 1951 Anzus treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the US was designed to guard against any regional resurgence by Japan.
New Zealand has so far been excluded from Aukus because of our anti-nuclear policy and a suspicion we have become too close to China in recent years. We are already viewed as a less-reliable partner in the Five Eyes intelligence sharing agreement because of our economic links to China.
Last week, Prime Minister Chris Hipkins brushed the Aukus agreement aside, pointing out that our anti-nuclear policy made our participation impossible, and was not going to change. But it is not quite that straightforward. On a flying visit to New Zealand at the weekend, to meet the Minister of Defence, the US’ Indo-Pacific security co-ordinator announced that the US wants to launch “a bilateral engagement between the United States and New Zealand on technology … led by the White House” as part of a “second tranche” of the Aukus agreement.
So, New Zealand is likely to become part of Aukus – just not the military aspect – in short order, which makes the agreement far more significant to New Zealand than Hipkins tried to imply last week. That raises fresh questions about New Zealand’s role.
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When Aukus was first mooted last year, a senior Pentagon official described it as “a new Anzus that sidelines New Zealand”. If that view still prevails in the Pentagon, it casts doubt on how effective the new bilateral technology agreement floated at the weekend will be, and what benefits it may hold for New Zealand.
Hipkins won't be able to push Aukus to one side indefinitely. He will need to spell out very soon what New Zealand’s role in Aukus will be before the US does it for him.
Or is this just another attempt by the US to pressure New Zealand into abandoning its now cemented bipartisan anti-nuclear policy? Even the weekend’s technology announcement touched on this, with the US saying while it understood New Zealand’s nuclear “sensitivity”, the door was open to New Zealand to join “when it felt comfortable”.
There are broader questions, too, about the efficacy of the nuclear submarine strategy. Last week, former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating described Aukus as a “great misadventure” and that Australia acquiring nuclear submarines was a “bad and dangerous deal”. In tones reminiscent of Sir John Key, he declared China is not the threat it is often feared to be. In essence, he was saying Aukus was a solution in search of a problem.
New Zealand needs a more critical debate about Aukus and where it might lead our region. One of the strongest arguments against the old Anzus pact was that it unnecessarily militarised our region at a time when regional security threats were far less prominent. Yet Aukus looks likely to do the same all over again.
Though there is concern today about China’s growing influence, there is no consensus about the best response. Germany and France, for example, hold similar fears about China’s emergence, but they have not been invited to join Aukus, nor have Asian states such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. That leaves the clear impression that Aukus is more a vehicle to reassert US influence in the region than a genuine multilateral security pact.
On that basis, New Zealand’s vaunted independent foreign policy could be at risk, were we to become too heavily involved in Aukus. Of concern is the backroom discussion, now obviously well advanced, about New Zealand’s possible “tranche two” involvement in Aukus. But when the Prime Minister brushes Aukus away as not relevant to us because of its nuclear component, he is telling only half the story. If is not relevant, why are we talking to the US about what role we might play?
The question of China looms large, which is why none of the political parties wants to initiate a public debate on Aukus and related issues. Since the Clark government’s 2008 Free Trade Agreement, we have become over-dependent on China, a fact the present government may privately admit, but will not concede publicly, for fear of Chinese trade retaliation, and its impact on the economy. They know that though the Key/Keating support of China plays well in Beijing, it is not necessarily shared by many New Zealanders.
Yet, as the Aukus debate intensifies, New Zealand’s careful, fence-straddling diplomacy of the past two decades will be tested as never before. We cannot afford both our current level of relationship with China and involvement with Aukus. As Aukus develops, China is likely to force us to make clear where we stand. Last week, China offered substantial assistance to rebuilding cyclone-ravaged areas as part of its Belt and Road initiative. New Zealand has yet to respond but was it just coincidence that the secret Aukus “tranche two” talks occurred a few days later?
Neither will Hipkins be able to push Aukus to one side indefinitely. He will need to spell out very soon what New Zealand’s role in Aukus will be before the US does it for him.
In that context, dealing with Nash’s erratic, boastful behaviour may be a welcome distraction for the Prime Minister. Although even then, as with China and Aukus, he will eventually have to take a firm stand.
