In June, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced the government’s latest attempt to reverse Japan’s historically low birth rate. The anticipated measures, which would cost an estimated $22 billion, include a pledge to double child care spending by the early 2030s and lift the income cap for child cash benefits, among other incentives that the Kishida cabinet hopes will encourage young Japanese couples to have more children.
Today, Japanese women on average have just 1.26 children—far below the rate of 2.1 children per woman, considered by demographers as necessary to maintain a stable population. Up to 42 percent of adult Japanese women and 50 percent of men will not have children in their lifetime, according to government estimates.
In January, Kishida said, “Japan is standing on the verge of whether we can continue to function as a society,” stressing the need to solve the crisis “now or never.” But Kishida’s plan to pour funds into child care is mostly a continuation of previous—and largely unsuccessful—natalist policies. The approach, though far more generous than the social safety nets offered by many Western countries, glosses over the structural factors dissuading young Japanese from getting married and having children: soaring living costs, wage stagnation, and acute gender inequality that forces many women to choose between motherhood and a career. It’s for these reasons that demographers—and, according to an April survey, 80 percent of the Japanese public—doubt Kishida’s plans will resolve Japan’s fertility crisis.
