No, says the Seventh Circuit, in yesterday's Doe v. Young, decided by Judges Michael Brennan, Amy St. Eve, and Nancy Maldonado:
After the University of Illinois investigated and dismissed him for sexually assaulting another student [Jane Roe], John Doe sued, arguing that the University's investigation was discriminatory and violated his right to due process…. The University … charged [Doe] with sexual assault, as well as drug manufacturing, sale, and distribution. Both Doe and Roe reportedly ingested "molly" (a synthetic drug) prior to the events at issue….
Doe alleged that the University—throughout its investigation—subjected him to race, gender, and disability-based discrimination, and failed to provide sufficient due process. He further alleged that his dismissal from the University was a breach of contract….
[T]he [district] court reviewed {two recent decisions from this court addressing the use of pseudonyms by litigants in Title IX student litigation[,] Doe v. Trs. of Ind. Univ (7th Cir. 2024) and Doe v. Loyola Univ. Chi. (7th Cir. 2024)} …. The court rejected Doe's suggestion that his alleged disabilities (a visual impairment and learning disability) justified proceeding anonymously or that the allegations against him in this case would subject him to acts of violence and harassment….
District judges have the discretion to permit pseudonymous litigation when the balance of harms justifies it. Anonymity can be justified by a minor's status, a substantial risk of harm, or improper retaliation from a third party. However, plaintiffs may not proceed anonymously merely to avoid reputational damage or embarrassment. And while anonymity has been common in Title IX litigation, these cases are "not an exception to the norm that adult litigants are identified by name." We uphold a district court's anonymity decision so long as the correct legal standard was applied, and the decision was based on facts supported by the record….
[Doe] argues, first, that the court ignored the risk of substantial harm he faces if he cannot proceed anonymously. He elaborates that interracial sexual relationships between White women and Black men are the subject of heightened prejudice and violent responses that create a tangible risk of retaliation and animus against him. In support, he cites the dissenting opinion from Thomas v. Lumpkin (2022) (Sotomayor J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari), which discusses the history of racism and prejudice evoked by interracial intimacy between Black men and White women.
