Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar's erstwhile senior general who seized power in February 2021, is on the move. After ramming through shoddy elections with patchy electoral participation last December and January, he now dons civilian garb as post-election president and was received on official visits by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in June. With a similar state visit to Laos in early July and prospectively to Thailand in August, Min Aung Hlaing is on a diplomatic roll that is putting pressure on Asean to re-admit him to leaders' meetings and to re-engage Myanmar broadly sooner rather than later.
Yet giving in to Min Aung Hlaing too much and too soon puts Asean's credibility at risk and its vaunted central role in promoting regional peace and security in question. Lest it is overlooked, Min Aung Hlaing has taken Asean for a ride before. After staging the coup and overthrowing a democratically elected government under Aung San Suu Kyi more than five years ago, the general signed on to Asean's so-called Five-Point Consensus (5PC) under the Bruneian chair in April 2021. The 5PC called for the cessation of violence, inclusive dialogue, humanitarian assistance and an Asean special envoy who would visit the country and mediate among conflict parties.
The military strongman did not comply with the 5PC and instead embarked on a brutal suppression campaign against what became a nationwide resistance movement. What began as peaceful civil disobedience evolved into a multi-front armed insurgency involving long-established ethnic armed organisations alongside newly formed People's Defence Forces under the National Unity Government (NUG). By late 2023, after Operation 1027 and subsequent offensives, Myanmar's military lost ground across multiple fronts.
At that point, the military appeared vulnerable and about to be toppled by resistance forces. Yet the resistance failed to seize its moment. While it had military momentum and overwhelming moral legitimacy, the resistance never developed sufficient political coherence and boldness to convert battlefield gains into an alternative governing authority. With PDF units of armed youth fighters, who grew up during the decade of reform prior to the coup, and EAOs taking the battle to the coup regime, the resistance needed a political offensive and assertive leadership that the NUG could not muster.
The NUG remained organisationally fragmented and struggled to project unified leadership both domestically and internationally. Thousands of young fighters continued risking their lives, but their military advances outpaced political organisation. The resistance lost not because it lacked courage or public support, but because it failed to transform military success into political authority capable of supplanting Min Aung Hlaing's junta.
As the NUG dithered while the EAOs and PDFs were unable to deliver the knockout blow, Beijing stepped in. Throughout much of the conflict, China pursued a careful balancing strategy. It maintained working relations with Min Aung Hlaing and the junta while not ignoring the NUG and preserving links with several ethnic armed organisations operating along Myanmar's northern frontier. Such pragmatism reflected China's extensive interests in pipelines, ports, mining projects and border stability. Beijing was reluctant to alienate whichever side ultimately prevailed.
But once Chinese leaders concluded that the resistance did not have what it took to topple the military, that calculus changed. Concerned by growing instability and the prospect of a fragmented and ungovernable Myanmar, Beijing exerted pressure on several ethnic armed organisations to step back and let the coup regime retake key territories, starting with Lashio in Shan state. The resulting breathing space enabled the junta to regroup, reinforce its positions, and regain the battlefield initiative. Combined with Russian military assistance, compulsory conscription and continued access to state resources, Chinese intervention tipped the strategic balance decisively.
Without Beijing's shift, the junta could still survive but not win. With Beijing's support, Min Aung Hlaing was able to reassert control of the political trajectory. The manipulated elections in December-January were the next step in that strategy. Widely criticised as neither free nor fair, they excluded meaningful opposition and failed all democratic and electoral standards. But these elections were not about the restoration of democracy but about political consolidation.
By exchanging military uniform for presidential office under a carefully managed civilian façade, Min Aung Hlaing has sought to transform himself from coup leader into head of state. While the elections did not confer popular legitimacy, they ticked a big box for him and provided governments seeking renewed engagement with a convenient procedural justification.
Having secured his position at home, Min Aung Hlaing's outward turn toward India, China, Laos, and Thailand will likely expand into demands to reclaim Myanmar's Asean chairmanship and the United Nations seat currently held by an ambassador from the pre-coup National League for Democracy-led government under Aung San Suu Kyi. In short, he is trying to turn military survival into regional acceptance, political recognition and eventually international legitimacy.
This changing diplomatic landscape presents Asean with a daunting dilemma. For more than five years, the Southeast Asian bloc has relied on its Five-Point Consensus (5PC) as the principal framework for addressing Myanmar's conflict.
Despite having signed it, Min Aung Hlaing has ignored 5PC commitments while Asean has remained divided over how to respond. Now that Laos, Thailand, and other member states are likely to engage the post-election Min Aung Hlaing-led government, Asean has to be careful not to do so too soon without concessions.
For example, if it is later discovered that Aung San Suu Kyi is not alive and well, Asean could lose credibility and centrality among major external partners, except China and Russia. If anything happens to ASSK under Min Aung Hlaing's watch, the Asean-centred summits later this year and next year may be boycotted by major world leaders. Similarly, as many thousands of Myanmar people have been killed and maimed by the junta government over the course of the civil war, the re-entry of Min Aung Hlaing also can be an attendance breaker for a range of Asean's external dialogue partners.
Meanwhile, if the resistance forces intend to put a stop to the military-backed government's gathering momentum, they would have to shift battlefield directions and soon turn the tide of the civil war in their favour, including a complete overhaul of the NUG leadership and its replacement with younger faces who are doing the actual fighting inside the country.
For Asean, re-engagement may be inevitable. But doing so prematurely would reward defiance, diminish Asean's credibility, and weaken the very centrality on which the organisation's relevance and effectiveness ultimately depend.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, PhD, is a professor and senior fellow of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University's Faculty of Political Science. He is also a non-resident associate with the Southeast Asia Centre at the London School of Economics.
