As fighting rages in the Middle East and Ukraine, another conflict-ridden region adjacent to both war zones may be on the precipice of a long-elusive peace. That region is the South Caucasus, where diplomatic efforts are underway between Armenia and Azerbaijan to strike a peace agreement following Azerbaijan’s victory in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. But the two are not operating in isolation: The conflict involves many of the same external players as both the Israeli-Hamas and Ukrainian conflicts—including Iran, Turkey, Russia, the European Union, and the United States. That makes the pathway to peace a challenging, interconnected road to maneuver.
The road to peace here may be quite literal. On Oct. 26, while at a summit in Tbilisi, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced an initiative known as the Crossroads for Peace, which calls for building transport connections to each of Armenia’s neighbors—Georgia, Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. The inclusion of the latter two is most notable, given that it was less than two months previous that Azerbaijan launched military operations to seize Nagorno-Karabakh with Turkey’s support, thus giving Baku complete territorial control over the long-disputed region.
The South Caucasus is one of the world’s least connected regions, both for geographic and political reasons. Mountainous and on the fringes of larger powers, numerous local and regional conflicts have also stifled trade and connectivity. Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey have long been closed due to the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, giving Yerevan only limited trade connections to Georgia, and by extension Russia, to the north and Iran to the south. In the meantime, Azerbaijan’s connections to its allies in Turkey and even its own exclave of Nakhchivan have been highly curtailed, with its western-bound exports of energy supplies relying exclusively on transit through Georgia.
Now, the issue of territorial control over Nagorno-Karabakh is no longer functionally in play, with the vast majority of the region’s ethnic Armenian residents seeking refuge in Armenia proper, while the region’s self-declared government announced that it would “cease to exist” as of Jan 1. As challenging as that has been for Armenians from both a humanitarian and political standpoint, it has removed one of the largest obstacles to peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, especially as Yerevan’s primary security patron—Russia—has made clear it will not be coming to Armenia’s defense on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
This has unlocked the potential for both peace and the long-sought economic connectivity that both Armenia and Azerbaijan have been attempting to foster. Previously, those efforts were made separately and often in contradiction with one another’s aims, such as Azerbaijan’s pursuit of the so-called Zangezur corridor to build road, rail, and energy connections to both Nakhchivan and Turkey through southern Armenia without a political understanding with Yerevan. Armenia was opposed to such a route, and while the status of Nagorno-Karabakh was up in the air, this was a point of contention between Baku and Yerevan. This became a politically charged issue on the domestic front in both countries, one that was manipulated by external players such as Russia and Iran.
Now, that calculus appears to have changed. Following Azerbaijan’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku appears more interested in following through with building economic connections than seizing more territory. In part, this is a legal and political issue—the same grounds that Baku used to justify its actions in Nagorno-Karabakh (which has been an internationally recognized part of Azerbaijan), would be undermined if it aimed to gain further territory in Armenia proper by force. But it is also a practical issue, as economic projects would be more secure with Armenia’s diplomatic cooperation and participation rather than they would be with resistance from Yerevan.
This is what makes the unveiling of Pashinyan’s Crossroads for Peace initiative so important. The initiative both acknowledges the principle of territorial integrity, which would be crucial for any peace agreement between Yerevan and Baku, while also proposing specific connectivity projects, such as the construction and restoration of pipelines, road, rail, cables, and electricity lines between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and beyond
Pashinyan emphasized the mutual benefits of such an initiative to countries throughout the region, while the fact that high level figures from Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran were present at the summit, along with Armenian and Georgian counterparts, underscores the groundwork that has been laid on this issue. At the same time, Azerbaijan has dropped the Zangezur corridor proposal in favor of routes through Iran. No less importantly, Pashinyan stated during his speech that a normalization agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan could be “successfully completed in the coming months.”
Nevertheless, there are many potential hurdles to this initiative and the broader peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan that underpins it. Notably absent from the Tbilisi Silk Road Forum were representatives from Russia. Relations between Yerevan and Moscow have significantly soured over Russia’s refusal to intervene on Armenia’s behalf in Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then, Armenian officials have explicitly criticized Russia’s stance in the war, refused to participate in several forums hosted by Russia, and signed agreements on military and security cooperation with France, a NATO member.
This is significant, given that Russia would not be happy with projects in the Caucasus that exclude its participation, particularly in energy, since Azerbaijan has sought to increase its natural gas exports to Europe as the continent diversifies from Russia. And while Moscow has lost a lot of ground in the Caucasus amid its focus on the Ukrainian war effort and Turkey’s rise in the region, the Kremlin has proved to be willing and able to sow chaos and act as a disruptive force in theaters throughout Eurasia and beyond where its interests are not met.
Besides the Russian challenge, other factors could prove disruptive to normalization efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan and connectivity efforts within the broader region. This could include political elements from within Armenia and its diaspora communities in countries such as France and the United States that are opposed to reconciliation with Azerbaijan, as well as any rhetoric from Azerbaijani officials that could perceived as threatening wider aggression. Additionally, there are thorny and politically sensitive issues for both sides, including border delimitation and mine clearance. Other conflicts could also spill into the region, especially given Russia’s prominent role there.
Despite all of these potential hurdles, there is a real chance for a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which could significantly enhance the connectivity of the region to the benefit of millions of people. This, in turn, could unlock further connections to a Trans-Caspian corridor to Central Asia, which would only be strengthened by the participation and increased investment from key players such as the United States and EU, as detailed in a recently released New Lines Institute report.
All of this will take delicate maneuvering and strategic decision-making by the leadership of Armenia and Azerbaijan to mitigate the risks and seize the opportunities at a critical time, both in their bilateral relationship and in their relationship with influential actors throughout the region.
