On 30 January 2015, Bayern Munich lost in the Bundesliga for the first time that season, going down 4-1 at Wolfsburg. Pep Guardiola was worried. They had dropped six points in the first 17 league games and the title was almost certainly theirs already, but Wolfsburg, inspired by Kevin De Bruyne, had picked them off on the counter.
The space Guardiola’s teams leave behind the high defensive line had always been a vulnerability, could not but be a vulnerability, but something had gone wrong with the press, allowing Wolfsburg freedom. And if Wolfsburg could exploit it, Europe’s elite would certainly be able to.
As options and ideas fizzed in his head, Guardiola decided he had to go back to first principles. He wrote his “bible”, as he came to refer to it, on the whiteboard on his office: two against four in attack; an extra man in midfield; an extra man in defence. They are explicitly Cruyffian values, the second and third commandments echoing the line Guardiola had written, when explaining the Dutchman’s philosophy in his 2001 memoir, about the need “to fill the centre of the pitch in order to play having numerical superiority”.
Football and Guardiola have evolved since then but, as he faces what is probably his greatest crisis as a coach, the tension clear in the welts he had scratched into his scalp as Feyenoord mounted their improbable comeback at Manchester City on Tuesday, the temptation must be to go back to basics.
If the “bible” remains as it was a decade ago, that means in facing Liverpool’s 4-3-3 on Sunday, Guardiola will go with a 4-4-2 (it should be said he did not follow his own advice against Barcelona in the Champions League semi-final in 2015, reasoning that Dani Alves was such an attacking full-back and Lionel Messi so sui generis that the usual rules didn’t apply; the back three he gambled on was overrun, leading ultimately to a 3-0 defeat).
Is a 4-4-2 a viable option? Perhaps had Julian Álvarez not been sold, he could have been paired with Erling Haaland, but it’s perhaps more likely to be a 4‑2‑3‑1 – Guardiola’s assistant, Juanma Lillo, was one of the pioneers of the system, at Cultural Leonesa three decades ago – with Phil Foden deployed centrally off Haaland. But Foden is very much an attacking midfielder rather than a second striker and if he did push up to try to make Virgil van Dijk and whoever replaces Ibrahima Konaté defend, it would mean the wide players having to operate very narrowly to create an overload in midfield.
Guardiola’s bible would demand a narrow four to combat Liverpool’s three, but with Rodri and Mateo Kovacic injured and Ilkay Gündogan so washed up he could be playing for Erik ten Hag’s Manchester United, it is not at all clear they have the personnel to do that. Perhaps Bernardo Silva and Matheus Nunes could be used flanking Gündogan and, if fit, De Bruyne. Perhaps Rico Lewis, who has youthful energy if not much muscularity, could return, or Foden could play on the left with Jack Grealish used off Haaland. But none of those options bristle with the authority of the City of even a month ago.
In truth, the shape doesn’t really feel like the issue. There has been an extraordinary sense over the past few weeks of a club imploding. Even before they started losing, City had struggled against Newcastle, Wolves, Fulham and Southampton. Injuries have not helped, certain players look old and questions, in the light of some of those absences, can be asked about recruitment, but what has been most shocking has been the lack of basic application. Is it a general sense of unease as the hearing into the Premier League charges goes on? Has the squad grown weary of Guardiola’s intensity? Has hunger waned after so much success? Something fundamental seems broken.
De Bruyne spent most of the final minutes against Feyenoord pointing and shouting; nobody was making the runs so he could move the ball on – and for a system based on turning the game into an almost permanent rondo that is a major problem. But nor was anybody making defensive runs.
The third goal, scored in the final minute with City a goal up, was a five-on-three break. Ederson’s charge from his goal didn’t help but, equally, where was everybody else? Why did Nunes stop tracking Jordan Lotomba before the second? Josko Gvardiol and Ederson have started making major errors. City have leaked 17 goals in their past six games.
So what do City do on Sunday? Calm things down and try to keep a clean sheet, something only Nottingham Forest have managed against Liverpool this season? That would be the orthodox solution, but injuries have left City with no holding midfield and holes in the backline. Besides, it is just not the Guardiola way: is his side really going to sit deep and look to go long to Haaland?
For Liverpool, meanwhile, this is a glorious opportunity. They already held an eight‑point lead at the start of the weekend. For them, a draw is a good result but – and in this regard Arsenal’s draw at City last March when a win would have opened a four-point gap is perhaps a useful precedent – they also have the opportunity to inflict a devastating blow on City. An 11-point advantage would not be decisive with 25 games remaining, but it would offer significant margin for error.
Who can City field at left-back that could even begin to counter an in-form Mohamed Salah? Given the inexperience of Lewis and Gvardiol’s scrambled mind, Guardiola would probably like to field Nathan Aké there, but he has only just returned from injury and may, anyway, be needed in the centre. If Kyle Walker returns at right-back, Luis Díaz could do serious damage if, as it appears, Walker’s pace has deserted him.
But underlying every tactical question is a nagging sense that none of it much matters. This is about City and Guardiola and their peculiarly intense psychodrama; Liverpool are league leaders but their part feels oddly subsidiary. Guardiola is a great coach and his squad laden with quality; they could still snap out of it. But over the past few days, the first serious thoughts have arisen that this might be the end.
